

Managing Through Getting Hacked:

Inside the Wild 18
Hours From First
Intrusion Through
Paying Them Off

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Learning Objectives

- Understanding how to manage through a significant cybersecurity event
- What the industry can do going forward to prepare for these types of events
- Statistics about the growing number of cyber security incidents impacting the healthcare sector

Would've Been Gibberish Headlines Just A Few Years Ago

Los Angeles hospital paid \$17,000 in bitcoin to ransomware hackers

Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center had **lost access** to its computer systems since 5 February after hackers installed a virus that encrypted their files

US hospital pays \$55,000 to hackers after ransomware attack

Hancock Health paid up despite having backups available.

Inside the New York hospital hackers took down for 6 weeks

Pugh runs the medical center's emergency room. She was on duty the morning hackers sent a ransomware message demanding \$44,000 in the cyber currency bitcoin to unlock hospital data being held hostage.

Key stats: ransomware in healthcare




Ransomware attacks increased by an astonishing 485% in 2020 compared to 2019



95% of organizations today pay the ransom so that they can unlock their files and get back to business



7% of your employees are responsible for 80% of the cybersecurity risks you face




34% of healthcare organizations were hit by ransomware in the last year

	HEALTHCARE (n=139)	CROSS-SECTOR AVERAGE (n=1,974)
Exploited vulnerability	29%	36%
Compromised credentials	32%	29%
Malicious email	22%	18%
Phishing	14%	13%
Brute force attack	1%	3%
Download	1%	1%

There's a large gap in understanding risks and preparing for them

How I think I look explaining cyber risk to the board



How I actually look



3 of the Big Ones...



NUANCE

2018 Attack; \$92M in losses



KRONOS

2021 Attack; Impacted over 8K businesses

**CHANGE
HEALTHCARE**



2024 Attack; over 4TB of data stolen,
millions in losses

A Preview of Things To Come...?

PayRoll OR Salary Sheet for XYZ Company

S.No	Emp.Name	Designation	Basic Salary	DA (10%)	HRA(8%)	PF(14%)	Gross Salary	EPF(ha
1	jawad Ahmad	Lecturer	25000	2500	2000	3500		
2	Adnan	Lecturer	30000	3000	2400			
3	Numan	professor	50000	5000	4000			
4	Asad Ahmad	professor	50000	5000	4000			
5	Saad Ahmad	professor	50000	5000	4000			
6	naveed ali	Lecturer	40000	4000	3200			
7	Anwar ali	assitant professor	65000	6500	5200			
8	Saeed Ahmad	assitant professor	65000	6500	5200			
9	Kashif Khan	assitant professor	65000	6500	5200			
10	Nawaz Khan	Lecturer	40000	4000	3200			
11	Adil Ali	Lecturer	40000	4000	3200			
12	Adnan Ali	clerck	15000	1500	1200			
13	Kamal ali	Peon	8000	800	640			

Sheet6



A close-up, slightly blurred photograph of a clock face. The numbers 11, 12, and 1 are visible, with the 12 being the most prominent. The clock hands are not clearly visible, but the focus is on the numbers. The background is a soft, out-of-focus white.

Nothing Good
Happens After
Midnight

The Last Message You Ever Want To See

What happened to your files?

Your network targeted by **RobbinHood** ransomware.

We've been watching you for days and we've worked on your systems to gain full access to your company and bypass all of your protections.

You must pay us in **4 days**, if you don't pay in the specified duration, the price increases **\$10,000** each day after the period. After 10 days your keys and your panel will be removed automatically and you won't be able to get yo are, just ask google, don't upload your files to virustotal or services like that, don't call FBI or other security organizations. For security reasons **don't shutdown your systems**, don't recover your computer, don't rename your files, it will damage your files. All procedures are automated so don't ask for more times or somthings like that we won't talk more, all we know is MONEY. If you dont care about yourself we won't too. So do not waste your time and **hurry up!** `Tik Tak, Tik Tak, Tik Tak!`

What happened to your files?

All of your files locked and protected by a strong encryption with **RSA-4096** ciphers.

More information about the RSA can be found here:


[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))


In summery you can't read or work with your files, But with our help you can recover them.

It's **impossible** to recover your files without private key and our unlocking software (You can google: Baltimore city, Greenville c

Just pay the ransomware and end the suffering then get better cybersecurity

How to get private key or unlocking software?




YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED

Don't worry, you can return all your files!
If you want to restore them, follow this link:
Use [Tor Browser](#) to access this address.
If you have not been answered via the link within 12 hours, write to us by e-mail:

Attention!

- Do not rename encrypted files.
- Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
- Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam.

So It Begins...


12:01am – First sign of ransomware attack noticed as staff start to find themselves locked out of certain files or drives

03:30am – Code Delta called, executives notified

01:00am – IT staff begin to investigate a flood of calls



Crisis Management 101



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First Set of Challenges


Overnight starting point with limited staff

IT help desk is outsourced

Not wanting to wake people up

Why Us?

Cyber Incidents (2008-2018)



Ransomware incidents (2016-present)






Figure 2: Percentage of organizations compromised by at least one successful attack.

Why Us?


Data breaches by industry 2022

Source: IT Governance



IT budget spent on cyber security

Source: Flexera



Why Healthcare is a Top Target

- The data is *highly* valuable
- Lack of investment/training in security
- Highly interconnected systems with a lot of entry points
- Illegal to conduct “Information Blocking”
- Fast moving parts, pieces, regulations and rules
- COVID19



...And It's Getting Expensive

Healthcare Organizations Struggle to Obtain Cyber Insurance Policies, Report Shows

As cyber attacks on health care soar, so does the cost of cyber insurance

Rising premiums, more restricted cyber insurance coverage poses big risk for companies

And We're Off To The Races...

06:00am – Call is placed to the US Attorney's office



06:30am – Cyber Insurance notified



06:35am – Incident command center is brought online with the first issue of notifying staff



What's in Scope?

Impacted

- UH Data Center
- Microsoft, payroll, time keeping, faxes, shared file storage, etc.
- ~70% of servers; ~400 PC's

Not Impacted

- Electronic medical record
- Third party applications remote or cloud hosted*




A Word About Third Party Vendors

The Question of the Day

Do you intend to pay the ransom or try to rebuild around the locked servers?

Risks of Paying the Ransom

Always consider the secondary risks when faced with a ransomware attack



New Industry Is Born



Day Shift Is Coming On...

06:45am – Staff are identified to call outlying clinics and run updates manually to different floors and units to update the situation

10:15am – Call with executives, outside counsel, cyber-insurance and cyber-negotiators

07:30am – FBI contact occurs, direction is provided to external cyber-negotiators

12:00pm – First negotiation takes place



**I DON'T KNOW
HOW BITCOIN WORKS**

**AND AT THIS POINT
I'M TOO AFRAID TO ASK**

imgflip.com

In The Meantime...

Clinical Staff

- Still seeing patients as EMR was not impacted
- Did not go on diversion
- Paging system still worked for codes or rapid responses

Non-Clinical Staff

- Notifying CMS and Joint Commission
- Planning for news coverage
- Supporting the ICC if their job is impacted

In the ICC

- How to handle communications?
- Planning for what happens if this drags out for days/weeks
- How to handle payroll as it was a pay week
- Tracking costs

Things Are Falling Into Place...

02:00pm – Settlement reached





02:30pm – Contract with external forensic expert to determine both true penetration and ensure that once systems are brought back online they are safe

03:30pm – External forensic team gains access to our systems



To Pay Or Not To Pay




The What If's...

1. **What If** they don't provide us the decryption key once we pay?
2. **What If** they come back a month later and do this again?



And Eighteen Hours Later...

05:00pm – Ransom paid
and decryption key
received



06:00pm – System restore
begins

A Long Tail

- Rolled out multi-factor authentication within 16 days of incident
- Forensic report found no further or lingering evidence of malicious code
- Staff mass texting software rolled out within a month of the incident
- ICC work plan was key to ensuring smooth operations
- Impact to third parties who may have shut off access during the incident

Could This Have
Been Prevented?




Rule # 1: You Can't Protect Against Dumb

1



Cyber triggers in healthcare (2008-2018)



Rule #  : You Can't Protect Against Dumb

So How Did This Happen?

A patient had downloaded an app from the app store with the code embedded in it and when the phone connected to our guest network, it released the ransomware

The phone was confiscated and provided to the authorities (no malicious intent by the patient)

A pink sign with white text. The text is arranged in three main sections. The top section says "Come in!" in a large, white, cursive font. Below that, in a smaller, white, sans-serif font, it says "*** WE ARE ***" with three stars on each side. A horizontal white line separates this from the bottom section, which says "OPEN" in a very large, white, bold, sans-serif font.

Come in!
*** WE ARE ***
OPEN

All's Well That Ends Well?



